Remuneration system of the Corporate Executive Committee

Remuneration components

The remuneration of the Corporate Executive Committee consists of a fixed compensation, benefits and a variable remuneration. The variable remuneration allows members of the Corporate Executive Committee to participate in the success of Galenica and to be rewarded for their individual contributions. The variable remuneration for the Corporate Executive Committee includes a short-term bonus (STI) and a long-term incentive (LTI). While the STI is based on the annual results of Galenica and the individual performance, the purpose of the LTI is to reward long-term performance and to harmonise the interests of shareholders with those of the executives.

The remuneration system rewards short-term success as well as long-term performance and sustainable value creation for customers and shareholders in a balanced way. In order to align the interests of members of the Corporate Executive Committee with the interests of shareholders, a portion of the STI (32%) and the full LTI is awarded in shares of Galenica. In addition, after a period of five years, each member of the Corporate Executive Committee is required to hold shares of Galenica equal in value to at least 75% of their fixed annual base salary and target STI.

The ratio between annual base salary and variable elements for the Corporate Executive Committee is defined in the Articles of Association of Galenica. The aggregate amount of the STI effectively paid out and of the grant value of the LTI is limited to 300% of the base salary for the CEO and to 250% of the base salary for each of the members of the Corporate Executive Committee. (Art. 22 (7) Articles of Association of Galenica Ltd.).

In addition to the remuneration components mentioned above, the members of the Corporate Executive Committee are eligible to participate in the share acquisition plan where employees are invited every year to acquire a certain number of blocked shares of Galenica at a discounted price (more information in the Notes to the Consolidated financial statements 2021 and in the GRI Report).

Overview of the remuneration components for the Corporate Executive Committee

Clawback and malus provisions
For the LTI, clawback and malus provisions apply in case of financial restatement due to material non-compliance with any accounting reporting standards, or in case a participant acts in violation of the law or internal regulations of Galenica.

Share ownership guidelines
After a period of five years, each member of the Corporate Executive Committee is required to hold shares of Galenica equal in value to at least 75 % of their fixed annual base salary and target STI.

Annual base salary (fixed)

The annual base salary is the fixed compensation reflecting the scope and key areas of responsibility of the function, the skills required to fulfil the function and the individual experience and competencies of the respective Corporate Executive Committee member. The base salary is determined according to typical market practice (external benchmark) and the Group internal salary structure. A base salary at median of the benchmark is considered competitive and thus suitable to reward the expected level of skills and competencies. The base salary is typically reviewed annually based on market salary trends, the company’s ability to pay salaries at a particular level based on its financial performance and the evolving experience of the individual in the function. The annual base salary is paid out in cash in 13 monthly instalments.

Incentives

Galenica economic profit as a performance indicator

The STI and the LTI significantly depend on the achievement of the GEP. The GEP is a measure designed to reflect the principles of value-based management derived from an economic value added (EVA) approach. It is based on the understanding that in the interests of shareholders and other important stakeholder groups, Galenica will strive to achieve a long-term investment return which exceeds the weighted average cost of capital. GEP is the key indicator in Galenica’s value-based management concept. It comprises different values, such as net operating profit after tax (NOPAT), cost of capital (WACC) and invested capital. The Board of Directors considers the economic value added (EVA) approach to be a sound, recognised and meaningful concept that is in line with sustainable value creation. GEP is calculated as the net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) less the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) over the average invested capital. The extent to which the GEP increase is achieved has a 50 % impact on the STI and a 50% impact on the number of shares allocated under the LTI. Therefore, poor performance inevitably has a negative impact on the total remuneration (lower bonus, fewer shares, with each of them potentially having a lower value). Further information on GEP can be found in the Value based management section, under Alternative performance measures in the Annual Report 2021.

Short-term incentive (STI)

The STI aims to reward the achievement of the financial objectives of Galenica and recognises individual contributions to the company’s performance over a financial year. The target STI, i.e. the amount paid out if all performance objectives are reached at 100%, is defined individually and annually, before the beginning of the performance year. The target STI is expressed as a percentage of the annual base salary and varies depending on the function in the organisation and on the impact of the function on the overall business result. The target STI for the CEO amounts to 50% of annual base salary and ranges from 40% to 45% of annual base salary for the other members of the Corporate Executive Committee.

The achievement of Galenica financial objectives is weighted at 75% and individual objectives at 25%. In previous years, the financial objective was fully based on GEP. In 2021, a growth component in the form of Group annual net sales growth was added. This growth component accounts for one third of the financial performance objective (25 % of the overall STI), so that two-thirds (50% of the overall STI) are still based on GEP.

In 2021, the individual performance category was refined to include a maximum of three individual objectives, cascaded from the strategic objectives defined for the Group. At least one of these individual objectives refers to sustainability, chosen based on the core ESG topics identified in the sustainability strategy of Galenica. For 2021, the ESG objective is based on customer satisfaction.

Summary of changes to STI performance objectives

For each financial objective, a threshold, a target, a cap and a payout curve are defined annually by the Board of Directors upon recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, against which the results are assessed. The payout curve starts when the threshold is reached, which gives entitlement to 50% of the target STI. Achievement of all objectives results in a STI payment of 100%. The total STI is capped and has an upper limit of 200% of the target STI.

The achievement of GEP, Group annual net sales growth and of the individual objectives of the CEO is assessed by the Remuneration Committee and submitted to the Board of Directors for approval. The attainment of the individual objectives of the other members of the Corporate Executive Committee is assessed by the CEO and, in consultation with the Chair of the Board of Directors, submitted to the Remuneration Committee for approval.

The payment of the STI is made in the subsequent year after the publication of the Annual report. The CEO and other members of the Corporate Executive Committee are required to draw 32% of their STI in Galenica shares; the rest is paid out in cash. A discount of 25% on the average stock market price for the month of December 2021 applies to the shares. The shares remain blocked for five years.

If employment ends due to termination, the calculation and payment for a completed assessment period (= financial year) are based on the effective performance and results. In the event of departure during an assessment period that is still ongoing, 80% of the target STI is paid on a pro rata basis.

Long-term incentive (LTI)

The objective of the LTI is to promote the strategy of Galenica, long-term thinking, alignment to shareholders’ interests and the creation of sustainable value for customers and shareholders over the long term. In addition, the LTI aims to strengthen loyalty to Galenica and identification with the company.

The CEO, members of the Corporate Executive Committee and selected members of Senior Management participate in the LTI.

The LTI is based on performance share units (PSU), which are granted to participants after the release of the results for the preceding year and which convert into shares of Galenica subject to the attainment of performance objectives over a three-year period defined by the Remuneration Committee. PSU are virtual; no real shares are issued.

The number of PSU allocated at the beginning of the plan period depends on a defined percentage of the annual base salary of the participant as well as the average share price during the final month prior to allocation, i.e. February. In 2021, the LTI grant for the CEO amounts to 50% of annual base salary and ranges from 25% to 35% of annual base salary for the other members of the Corporate Executive Committee.

The vesting of the PSU is conditional upon continuous employment and the fulfilment of performance conditions during the three-year plan period. The performance objectives are defined by the Remuneration Committee and for the LTI 2021-2023, they include GEP (as in previous years) and relative total shareholders return (TSR, new). Those two performance conditions are equally weighted.

The GEP target is measured by averaging the annual GEP results over the three-year performance period. TSR is measured as a percentile ranking against a peer group of relevant companies. The objective is to outperform half of the peer companies (100% payout). The peer group is approved by the Board of Directors and includes SMIM companies excluding financial services, real estate and companies that are active in a very cyclical businesses (e.g. Adecco, Dufry, Kühne+Nagel and OC Oerlikon), as well as selected healthcare and pharma companies from the SMI.

Relative TSR performance peer group for LTI 2021–2023

For each performance condition, a threshold level of performance is determined, below which there is no vesting, as well as a target level of performance, corresponding to a 100% vesting and a cap providing for a 200% vesting. A linear interpolation is applied between the threshold and the target, and between the target and the cap. The weighted average of the vesting multiple for each performance objective provides for the overall vesting multiple. The number of PSU initially allocated is multiplied by the vesting multiple at the end of the three-year plan period. More details on the LTI performance objectives are provided in the following table.

Overview of LTI structure for 2021–2023 

As a rule, the three-year plan period must be completed for employees to be eligible for the conversion of PSU in shares. If the employment is terminated within a plan period, the PSU forfeit without any compensation except in the following cases:

• Retirement, disability or termination by the company not for cause, performance or behaviour: unvested PSU are subject to a pro-rata vesting at regular vesting date
• Death: unvested PSU immediately vest pro-rata, based on a performance estimate by the Board of Directors or at target level (100% vesting)
• Termination following change of control: unvested PSU immediately vest in full, based on a performance estimate by the Board of Directors or at target level (100% vesting).

LTI plan period

In 2021, clawback and malus provisions were implemented in the LTI plan. They allow the Board of Directors to reduce or cancel the vesting of outstanding PSU and/or to claim back shares already vested in case of financial restatement due to material non-compliance with any accounting reporting standards, or in case a participant acts in violation of the law or internal regulations of Galenica.

Pensions and other employee benefits

Employee benefit plans consist mainly of retirement plans and insurance plans that are designed to protect employees against the risks of disability and death. The CEO and the members of the Corporate Executive Committee are covered by the pension scheme applicable to all employees. The pension solution of Galenica fulfils the legal requirements of the Swiss Federal Law on Occupational Pension Schemes (BVG) and is in line with what is being offered on the market.

Except for the expense allowance and the entitlement to a company car in line with the car policy of Galenica, the CEO and the members of the Corporate Executive Committee do not receive any particular additional benefits. The private use of the company car is disclosed at fair value in the remuneration table under other remuneration.

Share ownership guideline

Members of the Corporate Executive Committee are required to hold shares of Galenica equal in value to at least 75% of their fixed annual base salary and target STI within a period of five years of their appointment to the Corporate Executive Committee.

Employment contracts

The CEO and the members of the Corporate Executive Committee are employed under employment contracts of unlimited duration and are subject to a notice period of a maximum of 12 months. They are not entitled to any severance packages, termination payments or change-of-control payments. The employee contracts do not include non-competition clauses. With regard to clawback, the statutory claims for repayment apply (see among others Art. 678 (2) of the Code of Obligations, CO).